

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 08090 01 OF 03 251256Z  
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07  
PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 EB-08  
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R 251238Z AUG 77  
FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5490  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO JCS WASHDC  
DCA WASHDC  
OTP WASHDC  
USMCEB WASHDC  
DIRNSA FT GEO G MEADE  
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA  
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NATO 08090

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: ETEL MARR NATO  
SUBJECT: NATO POLICY ON INTERCONNECTING NATO AND NATIONAL  
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

REFS: A. USNATO 6921 DTG 181649Z JUL 77; B. USNATO 7702  
DTG 101708Z AUG 77; C. AC/270(WG/1)-WP/59(REVISED) (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: AS WE POINTED OUT BRIEFLY IN REF A, THE US AND  
NICSMA HAVE ACTIVELY PURSUED THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF  
INTERCONNECTING US SWITCHED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS WITH  
COMPARABLE ONES IN THE NICS. SOLUTIONS TO THE TECHNICAL  
PROBLEMS ARE NEAR, BUT SOLUTIONS TO THE NON-TECHNICAL PRO-  
BLEMS MAY BE SOME TIME AWAY. THE PROBLEMS WHICH MUST BE  
OVERCOME COVER A RANGE OF ISSUES, AND NATO HAS DONE VERY  
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PAGE 02 NATO 08090 01 OF 03 251256Z

LITTLE TO ADDRESS THEM. THROUGH THE ACTIONS REPORTED IN  
REF A, WE INITIATED THEIR CONSIDERATION BY NATO. IN THIS  
MESSAGE WE ELABORATE ON THE PROBLEMS, AS WE SEE THEM, AND  
SUGGEST A COURSE OF ACTION FOR THE US TO HELP OBTAIN SOLU-  
TIONS TO THEM. END SUMMARY.

1. IN REF A WE REPORTED ACTIONS WE HAVE TAKEN TO INITIATE

NATO ADDRESSAL OF POLICY QUESTIONS RELATED TO INTERCONNECTION OF NATIONAL AND NICS SWITCHED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (E.G., US AUTOVON AND AUTODIN WITH NATO IVSN AND TARE'S). AS WE STATED, US AND NICSMA TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAVE GONE A LONG WAY TOWARD SOLVING THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE INTERCONNECTION OF US AND NATO SYSTEMS, BUT NATO HAS DONE VERY LITTLE TO ADDRESS THE NON-TECHNICAL (POLICY) ISSUES THESE INTERCONNECTIONS PRESENT. FURTHER, WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED SEVERAL INSTANCES OF RESISTANCE TO RESOLVING THESE POLICY ISSUES. NEVERTHELESS, AS REPORTED IN REFS A AND B, WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SURFACING THE PROBLEM AND, PERHAPS, ENERGIZING THE MACHINERY TO OBTAIN RESOLUTION.

2. IN FEBRUARY 1974 THE DPC APPROVED A POLICY FOR THE USE OF NATO AND NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES (ANNEX TO DPC/D(74)2). THIS POLICY IS APPLICABLE, INTER ALIA, IN CASES WHERE NATO AND A NATION WISH TO USE OR SHARE EACH OTHER'S COMMUNICATIONS (THE CASE LABELLED "RECIPROCAL USE"), WHICH IS THE CASE COVERING INTERCONNECTION OF SWITCHED SYSTEMS. THE "POLICY" GOVERNING THIS CASE IS THAT EACH WILL BE HANDLED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS BECAUSE OF THE MANY VARIABLE FACTORS INVOLVED. HOWEVER, IN FORWARDING THE POLICY FOR DPC APPROVAL, THE NATO JOINT C-E COMMITTEE (NJCEC) DELIBERATELY OR NOT PROVIDED SOME GUIDELINES FOR THESE RECIPROCAL-USE ARRANGEMENTS. THE OVERRIDING CRITERION, FROM THE NATO STANDPOINT, WOULD BE THAT CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 NATO 08090 01 OF 03 251256Z

THERE WAS A DEMONSTRABLE BENEFIT TO THE ALLIANCE. ALSO, THE NJCEC RECOGNIZED THAT THESE INTERCONNECTIONS MAY PROVIDE INCREASED RELIABILITY, SURVIVABILITY, AND FLEXIBILITY OF EACH OF THE SYSTEMS. THESE LATTER BENEFITS ARE HARD TO QUANTIFY, AND THE NATO FINANCIAL COMMITTEES HAVE NOT YET SHOWN MUCH WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT FUNDS FOR THESE INTANGIBLE BENEFITS.

3. THE FINANCIAL COMMITTEES FORMULATE THE CRITERIA FOR ELIGIBILITY OF NATO COMMUNICATIONS FOR COMMON FUNDING. THE CURRENTLY APPROVED CRITERIA (MBC-M(69)96 PLUS OTHERS) ARE TOTALLY ORIENTED TO LEASE OF CIRCUITS FROM THE PTT'S. A MILITARY BUDGET COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP HAS DRAFTED A NEW CRITERIA DOCUMENT, MBC/WP(77)6. THE BASES FOR THE PROPOSED NEW CRITERIA ARE THE GRADE OF SERVICE AND THE NUMBER OF ACCESS LINES TO BE PROVIDED TO VARIOUS TYPES OF ELIGIBLE SUBSCRIBERS. THE DOCUMENT ALSO INCLUDES PROPOSED SCALES FOR THE NUMBERS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF SUBSCRIBERS FOR VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF ELIGIBLE USERS. THE NEW DRAFT CRITERIA ARE GEARED TO SWITCHED SYSTEMS, AN ESSENTIAL IMPROVEMENT, BUT NO PROVISION IS MADE FOR COMMON FUNDING OF INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN NATO AND NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.

FURTHER, THE BASES FOR THE NEW CRITERIA ARE NOT DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO INTERCONNECTIONS MADE FOR PURPOSES OF SURVIVABILITY, RELIABILITY, AND FLEXIBILITY EVEN OF NATO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.

4. ALTHOUGH NATO LACKS POLICY AND CRITERIA FOR INTERCONNECTION OF NATO AND NATIONAL SWITCHED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, PROJECTS FOR THESE INTERCONNECTIONS WILL BE FORTHCOMING, AND THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THEM MUST BE TACKLED. EACH OF THE INTERCONNECTION PROJECTS MAY HAVE UNIQUE FEATURES, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THESE PROJECTS WILL HAVE A

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PAGE 01 NATO 08090 02 OF 03 251305Z  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 NATO 08090

NUMBER OF ISSUES IN COMMON. THE OVERALL PROBLEM OF FORMULATING POLICIES TO COVER THESE COMMON ISSUES HAS MANY ELEMENTS. WE HAVE IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING AMONG THEM:

- A. ATTITUDES. SOME ALLIED REPS BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM IS TOO LARGE TO SOLVE; THEY APPARENTLY SEE IT ONLY IN ITS GLOBAL FORM, NOT VISUALIZING THE MANY ELEMENTS AS SMALLER, MANAGEABLE PROBLEMS. SOME ALLIED REPS (THE SHAPE ASST CHIEF OF STAFF FOR C-E (RICHTER) AMONG THEM) BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY FEASIBLE INTERCONNECTIONS ARE OF TRANSMIS-

SION LINKS; THEY HAVE NOT YET AGREED THAT THE BENEFITS OF INTERCONNECTING SWITCHED SYSTEMS WARRANT THE EFFORT TO OBTAIN THEM. ALSO, SOME REPS APPARENTLY HAVE PAROCHIAL REASONS TO AVOID ADDRESSING THE ISSUES; THEY MAY, FOR EXAMPLE, BE RELUCTANT TO CHALLENGE THE STRENGTH AND AUTHORITY OF THE PTT'S.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 08090 02 OF 03 251305Z

ITY OF THE PTT'S.

- B. REQUIREMENTS. THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT PRESENTED A VALIDATED MILITARY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT TO INTERCONNECT SWITCHED SYSTEMS TO ACHIEVE RELIABILITY, SURVIVABILITY, AND FLEXIBILITY. WITHOUT A VALIDATED REQUIREMENT, THE FINANCIAL COMMITTEES WILL NOT CONSIDER COMMITTING NATO FUNDS.

- C. FINANCIAL SHARING. NATO CURRENTLY ALLOCATES COSTS OF SHARED PROJECTS ACCORDING TO THE USE EACH SIDE MAKES OF THE PROJECT. FOR COMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS, THE MOST COMMON MEASURE OF USE IS THE NUMBER OF CIRCUITS ALLOCATED TO EACH SIDE. THIS MEASURE IS NOT SUITED FOR ALLOCATING COSTS TO INTERCONNECT SWITCHED SYSTEMS.

- D. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS. PTT'S IN THE VARIOUS NATIONS HAVE CERTAIN LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. SIMILARLY, MILITARY FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE CERTAIN TREATY RIGHTS. INTERCONNECTION OF NATO AND NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CAN IMPINGE UPON THESE LEGAL CONDITIONS.

- E. OPERATIONS. INTERCONNECTION OF TWO SWITCHED SYSTEMS BRINGS FORTH A NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL ISSUES. AMONG THEM ARE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE INTERCONNECTION, ESTABLISHMENT OF RESTORATION PRIORITIES, PRECEDENCE OF CALLS AND MESSAGES, AND CONTROL OF ACCESS TO ONE SYSTEM BY SUBSCRIBERS OF THE OTHER.

- F. SYSTEM INTEGRITY. ONCE SYSTEMS ARE INTERCONNECTED, THE OPERATOR OF EACH SYSTEM LOSES SOME FREEDOM IN CHANGING HIS SYSTEM. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN CONFIGURATION, TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS, AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 08090 02 OF 03 251305Z

ONE SYSTEM COULD IMPACT THE OTHER. THIS PROBLEM ELEMENT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT WITH REGARD TO INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN NATO AND NATIONAL TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, WHERE CHANGES COULD BE EXPECTED TO OCCUR MORE FREQUENTLY

AND RAPIDLY THAN WITH THE FIXED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

5. ALL THE PROBLEM ELEMENTS WE HAVE IDENTIFIED (AND OTHERS WE HAVE NOT) ARE IN THEMSELVES DIFFICULT PROBLEMS WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE NATO AND NATIONAL SWITCHED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS CAN BE INTERCONNECTED. OBVIOUSLY, SOME OF THESE ELEMENTS ARE INTERRELATED, AND SOLUTIONS TO ONE COULD INFLUENCE SOLUTIONS TO OTHERS. FOR THIS REASON, WE BELIEVE A SINGLE GROUP MUST OVERSEE THE OVERALL EFFORT. THE NJCEC IS OUR CHOICE, BECAUSE IT IS THE SENIOR C-E POLICY BODY IN NATO. HOWEVER, THE INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM ELEMENTS PROPERLY SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO NATO GROUPS COMPETENT TO ADDRESS THEM. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SHOULD DEVELOP THE MILITARY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT. THE FINANCIAL COMMITTEES SHOULD ADDRESS COST ALLOCATION AND ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA. COMPETENT LEGAL AUTHORITIES SHOULD SORT OUT THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERCONNECTIONS. THE NJCEC ITSELF SHOULD RETAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMMUNICATIONS ASPECTS, DRAWING ON OTHER PARTS OF THE NATO C-E COMMUNITY AS REQUIRED.

6. WE BELIEVE, FOR SEVERAL REASONS, THE US SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN SEEKING FORMULATION OF THE NEW NATO POLICY ON THIS SUBJECT. THE ATTITUDES PREVAILING IN SOME QUARTERS NECESSITATE A STRONG ASSERTION OF OUR INTEREST. WE KNOW THAT CANADA WILL SUPPORT US AND BELIEVE THAT GERMANY AND NICSMA WILL. THE JOINT C-E WORKING GROUP (JCEWG) REPORT ON CONSOLIDATION OF COMMUNICATIONS (REF C) RECOMMENDS THAT THE NJCEC HAVE THE JCEWG UNDERTAKE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS POLICY,

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PAGE 01 NATO 08090 03 OF 03 251308Z  
ACTION EUR-12

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 NATO 08090

AND WE EXPECT THAT THE NJCEC WILL AGREE. HOWEVER, ON SEVERAL PAST OCCASIONS, THE JCEWG HAS BEEN UNAGGRESSIVE IN TACKLING DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. CONSEQUENTLY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE US AND ITS SUPPORTERS ON THIS PROBLEM SHOULD STRIVE FOR THE NJCEC TO CHARGE THE JCEWG UNEQUIVOCALLY TO PRODUCE RESULTS. FURTHER, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE US (AND ITS SUPPORTERS) TO KEEP THE PROJECT MOVING IN THE JCEWG THROUGH INITIATIVE AND POSITIVE ACTION. WE EXPECT THAT SOME ISSUES EMERGING FROM THIS POLICY-DEVELOPMENT WORK MAY REQUIRE ACTION AT HIGH GOVERNMENT LEVELS FOR RESOLUTION, BUT THIS POSSIBILITY SHOULD NOT DETER THE JCEWG (OR THE NJCEC). THE OBJECTIVE MUST BE - AND REMAIN - TO IMPROVE THE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE THROUGH BENEFITS OFFERED BY INTERCONNECTION OF SYSTEMS.

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PAGE 02 NATO 08090 03 OF 03 251308Z

7. WE RECOMMEND A US ACTION PLAN BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

- A. A STRONG US STATEMENT IN THE NJCEC IN OCTOBER 1977.
- B. INTRODUCTION BY THE US OF PAPERS IN THE JCEWG (AFTER NJCEC TASKING) TO SERVE AS STARTING POINTS FOR THE SEVERAL ELEMENTS OF THE REQUIRED NEW POLICY. (THESE, WE FORESEE, COULD BE DEVELOPED TO REFLECT US PREFERENCES FOR THE POLICY ELEMENTS.)
- C. US INTERVENTIONS IN THE DPC (OR COUNCIL) AND THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CALLING ATTENTION TO THE WORK UNDERWAY IN THE NJCEC, STRESSING THE NEED FOR COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE BY OTHER NATO COMMITTEES, AND SOLICITING ALLIED NATIONAL SUPPORT AT THE POLITICAL LEVELS TO OVERCOME OBSTACLES TO ACHIEVING THE BENEFITS OF THIS FORM OF RATIONALIZATION.

8. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON GUIDANCE. GLITMAN

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## Message Attributes

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